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COMMENT
SECTION 70(d) OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT: THE
NEED FOR AMENDMENT
DOUGLASS

G. BOSHKOFFt

Recently there have been proposals' for amendment of Section 70(d)
of the Bankruptcy Act.2 The need for amendment is the topic of this

Comment.
Bankruptcy can be initiated by the filing of either a voluntary or an
involuntary petition.' Particularly in the latter case it is likely that the
bankrupt will remain in possession of at least some of his property for a
significant period of time following the petition. There is then the risk
that the bankrupt may engage in post petition transactions which
diminish the estate. Should this happen, a choice must be made: are those
who deal with the bankrupt to be protected at the expense of his unsecured
creditors? Rigorous application of the doctrine of lis pendens would call
for abrogation of all post petition transactions initiated by the bankrupt,
since the trustee's title is fixed by the date of the filing of the petition."
According to this theory, if the petition is well founded the bankrupt will
not subsequently be entitled to sell property or receive satisfaction of
obligations owed to him. But, although bankruptcy is lis penders,5
the rule has never been applied with such rigor that all post petition
transactions with a bankrupt are invalid. Concessions have been made to
protect third parties who engage in post petition transactions with the
bankrupt.
Prior to 1938 the extent of this protection, in other than real
property transactions, could only be judged by inspection of judicial
decisions. It was held that the trustee's title dated from the filing of the
petition because, although an adjudication subsequent to the petition
f Professor of Law, Indiana University.

1. Bateman, Post-Bankruptcy Transfers: An Old Problem
Solution, 53 CORN. L. REv. 280 (1968); 1967 DuxE L. J. 1023.
article containes a detailed review of the development of sections 21g
2. 11 U.S.C. § 110(d) (1964) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Act
§ 11(d) (1964) is cited as section 70(d)].
3. Bankruptcy Act §§ 3b, 4a-b, 11 U.S.C. §§ 21(b), 22(a)-(b)
4. Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § l10(a) (1964).
5. Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1 (1901).

in Need of a New
Professor Bateman's
and 70d.
§ 70(d), 11 U.S.C.
(1964).
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was required, this adjudication related back to the filing date.' The
operation of this doctrine of relation back was, however, limited by
extending some protection to parties who dealt with the bankrupt in the
period between the filing of the petition and the adjudication.' Undesirable uncertainty was the result so the Chandler Act of 1938 contained
provisions specifically dealing with this problem.8 The statute explicitly
spelled out the type of protection that was to be afforded post petition
transactions. In the case of real property, section 2 1(g)' protects
subsequent purchasers until notice of the bankruptcy proceeding appears
in the recording system. All other transactions are covered by the
provisions of section 70(d)."o

According to the statute the bankrupt may engage in post petition
transactions which will bind the estate only in a limited number of
situations: (1) the adjudication must not have occurred and (2) a
receiver must not have taken possession of the property which the
bankrupt seeks to convey. This is stated by the introductory clause of
section 70(d), and the theory of protection is clear. It would be unwise
to give the bankrupt an unlimited power of alienation, for this would
6. Everett v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1 (1901).
6. Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474 (1913).
7. Bateman, supra note 1, at 284-87; Maclachlan, Amendment of the Bankruptcy
Act, 40 HARV. L. Rxv. 586, 612-13 (1927).
8. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 525 § l(d), 52 Stat. 879, as amended, Bankruptcy
Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1964).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 44(g) (1964). In the county where the bankruptcy court sits,
notice is to be achieved by reference to the federal court records. In every other county,
notice must be effectuated by an affirmative act of filing in the state recording system.
2 W. CoLLEn, BANxKRETcY 372 (14th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
10. After bankruptcy and either before adjudication or before a receiver
takes possession of the property of the bankrupt, whichever first occurs(1) A transfer of any of the property of the bankrupt, other than real
estate, made to a person acting in good faith shall be valid against the trustee
if made for a present fair equivalent value or, if not made for a present fair
equivalent value, then to the extent of the present consideration actually paid
therefor, which amount the transferee shall have a lien upon the property so
transferred; (2) A person indebted to the bankrupt or holding property of the
bankrupt may, if acting in good faith, pay such indebtedness or deliver such
property, or any part thereof, to the bankrupt or upon his order, with the same
effect as if the bankruptcy were not pending; (3) A person having actual knowledge of such pending bankruptcy shall be deemed not to act in good faith
unless he has reasonable cause to believe that the petition in bankruptcy is
not well founded; (4) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this
subdivision shall not apply where a receiver or trustee appointed 'by a United
States or State court is in possession of all or the greater portion of the nonexempt property of the bankrupt; (5) A person asserting the validity of a
transfer under this subdivision shall have the burden of proof. Except as
otherwise provided in this subdivision and in subdivision g of section 21 of
this Act, no transfer by or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of bankruptcy shall be valid against the trustee: Provided, however, That nothing in
this Act shall impair the negotiability of currency of negotiable instruments.

SECTION 70(d)
11
allow him to frustrate the purpose of the bankruptcy proceedings.
Protection of the jurisdiction of the court is the rationale of the doctrine
of lis pendens" and it is as fully appropriate to a bankruptcy proceeding
as to any other proceeding involving property rights.

At the same time there may be cases in which the petition is not well
founded and the bankrupt should be protected against this possibility.
This is accomplished by continuing his power to pass title until such
time as the adjudication firmly establishes that the proceeding is merited.
The bankrupt may not, of course, convey good title, even prior to the
adjudication, if a receiver is in possession of the specific item.'"
Another, although secondary, aspect of the statute relevant to this
point is the solicitude shown to bona fide purchasers. The doctrine of
Hs pendens sacrifices the interests of such purchasers in order to protect
the jurisdiction of the court. But exceptions to such a rule can be expected
when strengthening the hand of the bona fide purchaser will not seriously
impair the effectiveness of the judicial proceeding. This helps explain the
statutory rule. If the receiver does in fact have possession of a specific
item, there is no possibility of bona fide purchase because the bankrupt
will not be able to explain his lack of possession. But when the bankrupt
still has possession and there has been no adjudication, a bona fide
purchaser ought to be able to deal with a bankrupt in confidence because,
first, he has no practical way of finding out about the bankruptcy proceeding and second, a legitimate argument can be made for permitting the
bankrupt to remain in control of his affairs. The concurrence of these two
reasons is important for neither alone is sufficient to explain section
70(d). At some point the bankrupt must lose his power to sell property
or discharge obligations even when the person dealing with him is
completely in good faith. This point is marked by the adjudication which
fixes the outer limits of protection. 4
If this were the extent of the coverage of section 70(d), the pattern
would be clear. Real property transactions would be protected under
11. A requirement that those dealing with the bankrupt act in good faith and give
present fair equivalent value will not protect the estate in all cases. The bankrupt may
dissipate the proceeds of the transaction or may engage in transactions which are unwise
during a period of liquidation. Cf. Bateman, supra note 1, at 306.
12. 4 ATmRCAN LAw OF PROPERTY 570 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 3 M. MmRLL,
NOTICE 60 (1952).
13. This would happen when the bankruptcy court appoints a receiver prior to
adjudication under section 2(a) (3) to conserve the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 11(3) (1964).
Such an appointment ordinarily will not be made where adjudication is unlikely but,
when made, represents a judgment by the court that the interests of creditors no longer
justify permitting the bankrupt to remain in control of his affairs. 1 COLLIER § 2.24(1).
14. If the third party knows that the involuntary petition is well founded, there is
no reason to validate his transactions with the bankrupt even prior to adjudication. This
is the effect of § 70(d) (3). 11 U.S.C. § 110(d) (3) (1964).

758
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section 21 (g)"5 until notice of the bankruptcy proceedings appeared in
the local recording system. This abrogation of the doctrine of lis pendens
is justified by both history and practice. Most states have modified the
lis pendens effect of state court proceedings by requiring that where real
property is involved there must be recording in an appropriate local
office." Section 2 1 (g) merely provides the same treatment for bankruptcy proceedings. While it is true that an uncooperative bankrupt may
make post adjudication transfers of his property that are not in the best
interests of his estate, such a concession to state recording requirements
is justified by the high degree of reliance that purchasers of real property
place on the record. And practically, the danger of diminishing the estate
is not too great. Because real estate transactions move slowly, the trustee
can usually prevent their consummation and, therefore, has relatively
little need for the doctrine of lis pendens.
All non-real estate transactions are covered by section 70(d) and,
when adjudication occurs, the protection for purchasers must cease. It
should be noted that there is more danger of dissipation when liquid
assets are involved; transactions in personal property and intangibles
are consummated much more easily than transactions in real estate. For
example, it takes little time to borrow on the cash surrender value of a
life insurance policy or draw a check. It seems strange that there has been
less of an inclination to apply the doctrine of lis pendens in non-real
property transactions 7 when arguably its application there is even more
necessary. As was noted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1919,
[t] he probability of defendant's entirely defeating the object of
the suit by a transfer of the property pendente lite is rather
greater in the case of personal than of real estate; and the
necessity of some law prohibiting such transfer, to the prejudice of the prevailing party, is therefore greater in the former
case than in the latter."8
Furthermore, except in certain isolated instances,'" there is no
dependable record to protect other than in real property transactions.
Personal property is fugitive. Recording statutes of a local character are
not effective ways of giving notice and the emphasis in the personal
property field has been on validating the claims of those who file rather
15. Bankruptcy Act § 21(g), 11 U.S.C. § 44(g) (1964).
16. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 570 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 3 M. MERRILL,
NOTICE 97, 99 (1952).
17. 3 M. MERRILL, NoTIcE 72-74 (1952).
18. Smith v. Curreather's Merc. Co., 76 Okla. 170, 184 P. 102 (1919).
19. E.g., automobile title certificates.

SECTION 7o(d)
than informing those who consult.2" Trust in the vendor as opposed to
trust in the record is a characteristic of dealings in this type of property.
Because of this, it is not necessary to be overly cautious about protecting
those who deal with a bankrupt and later learn to their sorrow of the
previous adjudication.
This would be a neat explanation of the congressional choices
embodied in section 70(d) if it were not for the language of section 70
(d) (4) stating: "[t]he provisions of paragraph (1) and (2) of this
subdivision shall not apply where a receiver or trustee appointed by a
United States or state court is in possesion of all or the greater portion
of the nonexempt property of the bankrupt." A literal reading of this
clause would suggest that there are two other events which will terminate
the protection afforded by section 70(d) (1) and (2). These are possession by a court official of (1) all of the nonexempt property of the
bankrupt or (2) the greater portion of the property. But this is most
curious draftsmanship since termination of protection has already been
dealt with in the introductory clause of section 70(d). One explanation
is that section 70(d) (4) refers to events occurring prior to bankruptcy
which do not terminate the special protection afforded by sections 70
(d) (1) and (2) but prevent these clauses from ever becoming operative.
This situation might occur when bankruptcy supercedes another form of
judicial control of the debtor's affairs. If the rationale of section 70(d)
suggested above is correct, that the involuntary bankrupt should not be
completely divested of his power of alienation prior to adjudication
because of the danger of an ill founded petition, it would make sense to
deny him this power when his affairs are for reasons other than this
proceeding, already in the hands of a state or federal official. The danger
of an ill founded petition is less in this case but, in any event, even if the
petition is dismissed, control of his affairs will be returned to the
superceded proceeding.
Although there is some support for this construction of section
70(d) (4),2" the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Lake v.

New York Life Ins. Co.22 ruled that section 70(d) (4) is operative
when a federal receiver, after the filing of the petition and prior to the
adjudication, takes possession of only part of the bankrupt's property.
This receiver was a bankruptcy receiver, as already explained, who would
be appointed under section 2(a) (3)22 and would take possession of a

specific piece of property under the introductory clause of section 70(d).
20. See the discussion of removal of collateral problems in 1 G. GILMORE,

595-631 (1965).
21. 4A COLLIER § 70.68 (3) n.9; 103 U. PA. L. REv. 556, 557-58 (1955).
22. 218 F.2d 394 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955).
23. Bankruptcy Act § 2(a) (3), 11 U.S.C. § 11(3) (1964).

SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
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This tortured construction of the statute could be noted in passing and
dismissed were it not for the curious support it gives to a proposal to
amend section 70(d). The argument proceeds along these lines: the
protection of bona fide purchasers under section 70(d) is terminated by
either (1) the adjudication or (2) the possession of the greater portion
of the bankrupt's property by a receiver or trustee as specified in section
70(d) (4). As Professor Bateman has put it,
[t] he principle reflected in the use of these two events in
section 70(d) for terminating the protected interval is that
either event is of sufficient public notoriety to constitute constructive notice of the bankruptcy to any third person who
may become involved in a post-bankruptcy transaction. Essentially, this is a form of the principle of lis pendens, by which
everyone dealing with property involved in pending litigation
is deemed constructively on notice of the litigation and its
outcome. The doctrine of lis pendens, however is usually applicable only to suits involving title to specifically identified real
property and is restricted by a requirement that a notice of
the suit be filed in the appropriate public land records.
Even subject to these limitations lis pendens is usually
regarded as a harsh principle, the use of which should be
limited to those situations in which it has become customary
and should be coupled with a requirement to give effective
public notice of the suit beyond the mere records of the court.
Section 70(d), however, is concerned only with personal
property, including intangible property, which is often involved
in rapidly moving commercial transactions. The section contains no provision for giving effective public notice of the
litigation beyond the records of the court. Since a bankruptcy
petition can be filed effectively in any district in the United
States, and since commercial transactions today are frequently
handled at high speed across great distances, it is obvious
that the principle of lis pendens has been pushed beyond all
reasonable bounds in section 70 (d).24
He then proceeds to suggest amendments of the Bankruptcy Act to
protect all those who deal with the bankrupt, even after adjudication,
until either (1) a receiver takes possession of the specific property
(as is now provided by the introductory clause of section 70(d) or (2)
until actual notice of the proceeding is received.
24. Bateman, supra note 1, at 308-09.

SECTION 70(d)
Professor Bateman is proceeding on the asumption that the theoretical justification for section 70(d) is unsound. He is arguing the
weakness of a constructive notice theory and the justification for his
argument is the possibility that a person may not be able to deal with a
bankrupt prior to adjudication because of the interpretation of section
70(d) (4) which makes it applicable prior to the adjudication and which
terminates the bankrupt's power to alienate porperty which is not in
possession of the receiver. But section 70(d) would not be regarded as
having anything to do with constructive notice were it not for the Lake
decision.2" If the operation of section 70(d) (4) were confined to prebankruptcy proceedings, then the bankrupt's power to alienate property
would be determined only by the adjudication or by actual notice through
possession by the receiver,26 both of which are specified by the introductory clause to the section. It does not make sense to base an argument
for amending the statute on such a questionable interpretation of section
70(d) (4). For other reasons, however, there may be some justification
for amendments. To this question, the balance of this Comment is directed.
II
In Bank of Marin v. England" the Supreme Court of the United
States held that despite the strictures of section 70(d) a bank which
honored a check after the depositor had been adjudicated a bankrupt was
not liable to the trustee in bankruptcy. Although the exact basis of the
decision is not quite dear, the Court relied heavily on principles of law
outside the statutory command. As Mr. Justice Douglas stated, "[there
is an overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise
of bankruptcy jurisdiction."2
The whole course of this litigation has not gone without notice. Law
reviews have published comments on the case as decided in both the court
of appeals 9 and the Supreme Court." The final result has been both
25. 218 F.2d 394 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955).
26. Or by the pre-petition appiontment of a receiver or trustee which has much the
same effect as the adjudication in determining that the bankrupt should not be able
to manage his property.
27. 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
28. 385 U.S. at 103. The voluntary petition was filed on Sept. 26, 1963 and
England was appointed receiver on Sept. 30, 1963. (He later succeeded himself as
trustee.) On October 2, 1963, he mailed notice of his appointment to the Bank of
farin which was received the following day. The checks were honored on October 2,
1963 and, in the district court the bank argued that England's failure to give notice of
his appointment by telephone should constitute an estoppel. Record at 63-64. The Brief
for the Petitioner in the Supreme Court urged equitable grounds for relief but did not
make a vigorous estoppel argument. Brief at 24-25.
29. Bank of Marin v. England, 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965), rez'd, 385 U.S. 99

(1966).
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praised and damned. Perhaps the most exasperation is expressed in the
latest revision of Collieron Bankruptcy:
[c]ited by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court is Pepper v. Litton, which without regard to its particular facts can and is used every time a particular contention
may be contrary to a provision in the Act or may not find support in any provision in the Act. In effect, it is commonly
used in this fashion: 'Since the court of bankruptcy is a court
of equity, Pepper v. Litton, it should reach this result because
it is the equitable one.' Now counsel and courts will be prone
to include an additional citation for the same proposition in
the same circumstances: 'Bank of Main v. England and
Pepperv. Litton.' 1
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court faced a difficult decision
in Bank of Marin. The bank in honoring the checks was merely performing its contractual duty owed to its customer, an obligation which it had
assumed prior to bankruptcy. Not only had the account been opened prior
to bankruptcy but the checks had been issued prior to bankruptcy. The
facts would have presented no difficulty except for the well established
rule that a check, by itself, is not an assignment of funds on deposit. 2
Since the Court accepted this rule, it could not hold that the transfer
ante-dated the trustee's acquisition of title."3
The approach adopted by the Supreme Court is controversial because
the rationale for its opinion is not clear. The opinion is unequivocal only
in its demonstration that the Court did not like the result which it felt
would follow from a literal reading of the statute. In addition, if the
Supreme Court takes seriously its suggestion that "equitable considerations" are significant in a case like this, there is the possibility that there
may be substantial erosion of the protection afforded the bankrupt estate
by the principle of lis pendens. There have already been suggestions that
the statute should be amended, either to correct the decision or at least to
remove the uncertainty which has followed in its wake. Such suggestions
are premature.
30. 16 Am. U.L. REv. 409 (1967); 16 CATE. U.L. REv. 323 (1967); 1967 DuKE
L.J. 1023; 52 IowA L. REv. 997 (1967); 65 MicH. L. Rxv. 195 (1966); 31 Mo. L. Rxv.
565 (1966); 41 NY.U.L. REv. 430 (1966); 45 N. CAR. L. REv. 1025 (1967); 42
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 818 (1967) ; 18 SYRA. L. RFv. 853 (1967) ; 42 TUL. L. REv. 210
(1967); 15 U. K(AN. L. REV. 100 (1966); 28 U. PiTT L. REv. 579 (1967) ; 20 VAND. L.
REv. 1152 (1967); 52 VA. L. REv. 528 (1966) ; 18 W. REs. L. RFv. 1369 (1967).
31.

CoLLIER § 70.68.

32. 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan).
33.

The petitioner did not argue that the transfer of funds occurred before

bankruptcy.
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It is far from clear that Bank of Matin was anything other than a
poorly articulated rejection of a state property concept; if, under state
law, the transaction had been consummated when the check was drawn
rather than when it was presented for payment there would have been no
argument about the validity of the bank's action. State rules of substantive law need not, and indeed have not, been accepted by bankruptcy
courts when they frustrate a clearly expressed bankruptcy policy."'
Normally, the rejection of state rule is negative, that is when it limits
the rights of the trustee in an unacceptable manner. But the reverse can
also be true.
The trustee in Bank of Matin was seeking to exploit the advantage
accuring from the California rule that payment by check did not give
the payee enforceable rights in the drawer's account. In his view, it was
not significant that the transaction originated prior to bankruptcy at a
time when the bankrupt could not be regarded as trying to defeat the
jurisdiction of the court. Instead his argument involved a mechanical
combination of federal statute and state law to reach a result not clearly
justified by the history and purpose of section 70 (d).
Where the Bankruptcy Act calls for a reference to state law, as it
does in section 70(d), the reference must be made in a discriminating
manner. Due regard for the role of state law in the resolution of controversies arising in the course of bankruptcy administration requires
something other than wooden acceptance of state substantive rules which
are not clearly inimical to the trustee's position. Undue deference to state
law, regardless of the bankruptcy consequences, is just as undesirable as
an outright denial of any role for state law in resolving these controversies. The Supreme Court has shown its awareness of the need for controlling exploitation of all the advantages which theoretically might accure
to the trustee from a combination of state and federal law. In 1961,3
it rejected a construction of section 70(c) 8 which would have permitted
the trustee to create a hypothetical situation in which a state recording
statute would have invalidated a chattel mortgage, even though the lien
was indefeasible under state law by the time bankruptcy occurred. While
the Bankruptcy Act might be read to permit such result, Mr. Justice
Douglas stated: "that is too great a wrench for us to give the bankruptcy
system, absent a plain indication from Congress which is lacking here."3 "
34. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); cf. Chicago Board of Trade v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924) ; Barutha v. Prentice, 189 F.2d 29 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 841 (1951). But cf. Hertzberg v. Associates Discount Corp., 272 F.2d 6
(6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960).
35. Lewis v. Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
36. Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964).
37. Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 610 (1961).
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The problem was essentially the same in Bank of Marin for the trustee
was seeking to exploit the advantage to which he was arguably entitled
because of the capricious interaction of state and federal law. Instead of
speaking of equitable considerations it would have been perfectly proper
for the court to have held that the transfer was complete for the purposes
of section 70(d) although it was still inchoate for some non-bankruptcy
purposes under state law."8
If this interpretation of the Bank of Marin case is correct there is
nothing in the decision which suggests that immediate amendment of the
Bankruptcy Act is necessary. It is of course possible that the obscure
opinion of Justice Douglas suggests much more. The Court might take its
equitable responsibility seriously and emasculate section 70(d) by protecting bona fide purchasers in transactions which originate after the
adjudication. Or it might hold that the doctrine of Us pendens involves
an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law."9
But it would be unwise to amend the Bankruptcy Act to take care of
problems suggested by some readings of Justice Douglas' opinion until
it is apparent that such problems really exist. The facts are so peculiar
that a wait and see attitude is justified.
III
Proposals for amendment of section 70(d) need not be directed at
correcting or ratifying the decision in Bank of Matin. General disaffection with the doctrine of lis pendens may generate proposals for reform
and at least two types of amendments are possible:
(1) elimination of the lis pendens effect of bankruptcy in all cases
where the person dealing with the bankrupt has no actual notice of the
proceeding, or
(2) retention of the present statutory scheme for involuntary proceedings but adoption of a new procedure for voluntary bankruptcy.
Professor Bateman 1 has suggested that those dealing with a
38. Engstrom v. Wiley, 191 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1951) held that the payment of an
obligation by check did not convert a cash sale into a preferential transfer under a
state preference statute although the check was not cashed until some time later. It has
been assumed that the same result would obtain under the federal statute. 3 COLLIER §
60.14; J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 292 (1956).
39. The Ninth Circuit expressly rejected this possibility. Bank of Marin v.
England, 352 F.2d 188, 191-92 (9th Cir. 1965). As Mr. Justice Harlan notes in his
dissent, 385 U.S. at 103 (1966), the majority avoided resting its decision on constitutional
grounds. Opinion is divided as to whether there is a constitutional infirmity in the
doctrine of lis pendens. Compare 52 IowA L. RFv. 997, 1001-02 (1967) with 1967 DUKE
L.J. 1023, 1030-31 and 65 MIcH. L. REv. 195, 197 n.14 (1966). See also Bateman, supra

note 1, at 310.
40. A proposal limited to vlountary proceedings can be found in 1967 DUKE L.J.
1023.
41. Bateman, supra note 1, at 310-12.
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bankrupt be protected, even after the adjudication, until such time as (1)
the receiver or trustee takes possession of the property in question or (2)
the third party has actual notice of the pending proceedings. This actual
notice would be achieved by one of two methods. Those persons indebted
to or holding property of the bankrupt would presumably be listed in
the schedules and could be notified directly. 2 Potential purchasers of
property of the bankrupt could not be identified but would need to be
warned by publication both at the situs of the bankruptcy proceeding and
in all localities where property of the bankrupt is located.
This proposal definitely favors the interests of third parties over
those of the bankrupt's general creditors and, for some time, there has
been a trend in property law to strengthen the hand of the bona fide
purchaser. The motto "all the world loves a bona fide purchaser", while a
labored aphorism reflects the temper of our times. Perhaps section 70 (d)
will be amended to give further recognition to this fact. Nevertheless, it
is worthwhile to ask whether the bona fide purchaser's case is so strong
that the interests of the estate should be sacrificed. If the protection could
be accomplished with a minimum of risk and expense to the estate it
might be worthwhile amending the statute. But it is far from certain
that the risk and expense would be minimal.
It is not possible to estimate accurately what risks would be involved
if the bankrupt retained a relatively unlimited power to sell property and
satisfy obligations subsequent to adjudication. The spector of dissipation
has been raised," but there is no way of measuring the potential damage
to the estate. Thus, a justification of lis pendens rests upon assumptions
that can not be supported by evidence. Any defense of the doctrine must
fall back on the perceived recognition of its usefulness as evidenced by
long retention in the legal system.
It is possible to be more specific about the expense and difficulty
of arranging for actual notice. The existence of tangible property of
the bankrupt in the possession of third persons or obligations owed to
the bankrupt should be revealed in the schedules attached to the voluntary
petition because in such a proceeding the bankrupt will generally be
cooperative. The risk of alienation in derogation of the proceeding is
minimal and the opportunity to give notice is present so that the risk to
the estate is fairly limited. The mechanics of such notification are, however, not simple. Even in a voluntary proceeding the trustee does not
take office immediately. He is designated at the first meeting of credi42. No mention is made of the consequences of a failure to schedule assets.
43. 1967 DUxE L.J. 1023, 1035; 70 H.Rv. L. REv. 548, 549 (1957); 65 MIcH.
L. REv. 195, 202 (1966).
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tors" which may be held no less than ten days after the adjudication."
If notice is to be given by the trustee, there will be an appreciable period
following adjudication in which the estate may be depleted. If this notice
is to be given at an earlier time, provision must be made for the designation of a person to give it. One possibility is to secure the appointment
of a receiver under section 2 (a) (3) " for the specific purpose of notifying
those holding property of the bankrupt.
The mechanics of notice are more complicated when the bankruptcy is involuntary. The bankrupt's hostility will increase the risk of
transfers in derogation of the proceedings and information as to the
identity of property held by third persons and obligations owed to the
bankrupt will not be as readily available- as in a voluntary proceeding.
The bankrupt's obligation to furnish a schedule of assets is deferred
under section 7(a) (8) " until five days after the adjudication and may
be extended upon a showing of cause. The only way to secure information prior to that time would be to ask for a section 21 (a) 8 examination
which may be had at any time prior to the adjudication49 and which will
reveal assets, including bank accounts, that can be tied up by the giving of
notice. But if actual notice is to be the method by which the bankrupt's
power of alienation is to be terminated, it should be based on information
which can be gathered with a minimum of expense and delay and it is
likely that in the normal involuntary proceedings the filing of the schedule
under section 7(a) (8) will be the first readily available source of
information upon which to base an actual notice rule.
The second part of Professor Bateman's suggestion is that, as to
those who may become innocent transferees for value, a system of notice
by publication be adopted. Such potential transferees can not be identified
from the schedules or from any source of information, but he suggests
that substitution of publication at the situs of the property and the situs
of the proceeding will create substantially more notoriety than the adjudication does today. But it is necessary to question whether or not the
gains from increased notoriety are worth the additional burden to the
estate. It is not clear for instance what types of transferees would find
notice by publication valuable. Banks and insurance companies listed in
the schedules would not be interested as they would already be receiving
actual notice. The other types of transferees-individual, unsophisticated
buyers-are not likely to check bankruptcy notices before purchasing.
44.
45.

Bankruptcy Act § 44a, 11 U.S.C. § 72(a) (1964).
Bankruptcy Act § 55a, 11 U.S.C. § 91(a) (1964).

46. Bankruptcy Act § 2(a) (3), 11 U.S.C. § 11(3) (1964).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 25(a) (8) (1964).

48. 11 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1964).
49. 2

COLLIER §

21.08.

SECTION 7o(d)
Furthermore the mechanics of publication are cumbersome. Publication
at the site of the proceeding would not be likely to come to the attention
of prospective purchasers in other jurisdictions. Publication at the site of
the property might become very complicated when the estate was distributed over wide areas and would, in any event, be of little practical
value since the property could easily be moved and sold in a different
locality if the bankrupt were so inclined. The gains to potential transferees really do not seem worth the risk of depleting the estate.5"
Another possibility which Professor Bateman does not suggest is to
confine the amendment of the Bankruptcy Act to providing special
treatment for voluntary proceedings. The chances of dissipation through
post-petition debtor activity are less than in involuntary proceedings and
information is contained in the bankruptcy schedules and may be readily
utilized in giving notice to third parties. If the danger to third parties is
so great that amendments to section 70(d) must be considered this is the
logical place to start.
For instance, some protection for third parties could be achieved
without undue risk to the estate by inserting a new paragraph in section
70(d) between current paragraphs (4) and (5) :
[i]n a voluntary proceeding the provisions of paragraph (2)
of this subdivision shall apply after the adjudication to assets
duly scheduled until the person indebted to the bankrupt or
holding property of the bankrupt receives actual notice of the
proceeding.
At the same time the phrase "appointed prior to the commencement
of proceedings under this act" should be inserted immediately following
the reference to "State court" in current paragraph (4) to correct the
tortured statutory construction adopted in Lake v. New York Life Ins.
Co."' This provision would protect those third parties who could be
given actual notice while placing on them the risk of omission of assets
from the schedules. There is no restriction on the persons who may give
notice to these third parties nor is responsibility for the giving of notice
imposed on the court, as opposed to the trustee.
The amendment is not, however, offered with the strong conviction
that it is necessary. The doctrine of lis pendens certainly is effective;
whether it can be condemned as harsh or unfair is not as clear. These
adjectives express a desire to strengthen the position of third parties.
Should such sentiments carry the day, the proposed amendment may
50. Professor Bateman's proposal appears to be a return to the constructive notice
theory which he originally criticized.

51. 218 F.2d 394 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955).
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reasonably reconcile the interests of such purchasers with those of the
bankrupt's general creditors.
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